Germany in I939> &ad clearly indicated a contempt for these ideological reasons. Moscow., endangered for a time in 19415 had employed the slogans of the Allies, but when that danger passed after the victory of Stalingrad, the Russians commenced^ simultaneously with an offensive in the field, a diplomatic offensive against the Allies. Demanding supplies and organising a campaign for the opening of a * Second Front.,7 the Kremlin attempted to define its future sphere of influence and to conduct an independent political action within that sphere in order to change the system of governments and frontiers to correspond with its coming plans for the annexation of that territory. It was soon to become evident in the winter of 1943 that the Kremlin was beginning to take over Hitler's political programme for the Continent of Europe. The means and weapons employed by Stalin were much more powerful and far-reaching than those used by Hitler. The Soviet diplo- matic action was accompanied by a propaganda campaign in the Allied countries who, unlike Russia, were even during the war, open to receive such propaganda. The Soviet main action, however, was directed towards taking over the already existing resistance movements operating in those countries occupied by the Germans., the resistance movements which recognised British leadership in the war and were based on the British supplies. To all of them, from Greece to Norway and from France to Poland, the Soviet Union had been Germany's collaborator during the first and darkest years of the war, therefore it was improbable to expect that Russia would be able to destroy their link with Britain and subordinate them herself. But nevertheless the Soviets tried, and to this end either formed their own Communist resistance movements in certain of those countries, or at least claimed that such a movement was existing, At any rate, they instigated a war between the national resistance movement already created and those * partisans * controlled by them. An action which, according to Russian calculation, seemed more profitable to the Soviet Union than the fight of a concentrated and united underground movement of Europe against Germany. Thus in the e Underground * was staged the first act of the Soviets3 struggle for Europe against the Allies. It has already been related how Tsardom had a strict and elaborate method of conquest unsurpassed by any other imperialist Power in the history of mankind. In Stalin's application of this method, however, there was something new, something which placed him on a high plane among the Russian leaders and among the world strategists of imperialism, namely, that he was employing this method in the camp of which he was a member and, moreover, when a war was in progress. Thus Stalin was proclaiming one of his allies as his enemy and by classifying him as one of Hitler's vassals, for whom " pity should not exist/* was justifying thereby "his extermination and liquidation of this same Ally.